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Growing Pains: Challenges for a Rising China 
Elizabeth J. Perry 
 
 
The accumulative achievements of China’s ongoing socioeconomic reforms are by most 
measures little short of astounding. From one of the globe’s poorest countries at the time of Mao 
Zedong’s death in 1976, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become a booming 
economy–second biggest in the world–thanks to a swift rise that has rescued hundreds of 
millions of its people from poverty and afforded the government enviable resources for further 
development. Yet while one may marvel at the speed and success of the so-called China miracle, 
neither the Chinese people nor their leaders seem at ease with the current situation. Rampant 
grassroots protest bespeaks intense popular indignation at everything from land grabs to 
environmental pollution, while top officials themselves rail against the corroding effects of cadre 
corruption and income inequality.  
To evaluate the challenges facing China after thirty-five years of reform is a difficult task, 
and not only because of the apparent disconnect between objective gains and subjective gripes. 
For one thing, the head-spinning pace of change threatens to render any academic assessment 
quickly obsolete. For another, the PRC’s post-Mao record of achievement is in fact decidedly 
uneven across geographic regions, social strata, and policy sectors. While major cities boast 
gleaming new infrastructure and attendant urban amenities that equal or surpass those of the 
advanced industrial world, much of the rural interior remains mired in grinding poverty. The 
affluence of new urban middle and upper classes, flush with the proceeds from lucrative real 
estate deals, is offset by the indigence of the millions of migrants who labor in their midst. And 
although the Chinese state can take credit, at least through the 1990s, for spearheading a series of 
bold economic measures that replenished central coffers and enriched many citizens, post-Mao 
achievements in the area of social welfare–not to mention political and legal reform–have to date 
been less impressive.  
The project of “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang), launched by reformist politician 
Deng Xiaoping in December 1978, only two years after Mao Zedong’s death,  brought both 
unprecedented prosperity and unparalleled problems. The most immediate initial challenge 
facing Deng and his colleagues was that of preserving Communist Party rule while dismantling 
the command economy and regimented social order that constituted defining yet debilitating 
features of classic Communist systems. This was a feat that had eluded most other Communist 
states. In subsequently characterizing his reform effort as “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” Deng Xiaoping drew attention to the distinctiveness of the Chinese trajectory.  
Swift as China’s ascent has been, it has not been seamless. The contradiction between an 
increasingly open economy and society and a still intact Leninist party-state came to a dramatic 
head only a decade into the post-Mao reform effort with the Tiananmen uprising of 1989, when 
millions of citizens joined hands to criticize inflation and corruption and to call for political 
reform. That was also the year, of course, when Communist regimes collapsed across Eastern 
Europe, soon to culminate in the breakup of the Soviet Union itself. In China, the state’s brutal 
suppression of the Tiananmen uprising, followed by its sustained attention to “stability 
maintenance” (weiwen), has deterred the resurgence of massive political protests. Yet among 
ordinary Chinese citizens as well as government officials, not to mention Western social 2	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scientists, there is widespread skepticism of the long-term compatibility between a flourishing 
market economy and a conventional Communist polity.  
*** 
From the very beginning of the reform era, the apparent incongruity in the basic makeup of the 
Chinese political economy has prompted persistent predictions of imminent regime change from 
outside observers. Significantly, however, this same sense of precariousness has helped motivate 
successive generations of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders to invent and implement an 
array of policies intended to preempt–or at least postpone–the need for a drastic political 
overhaul. For the first three decades of reform, as the state dismantled the rudimentary welfare 
provisions of the Mao era, it looked as though the only thing that could be considered socialist 
about “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was the continued rule of a ruthless Communist 
Party. Basking in the glow of stunning and sustained economic growth, party leaders were able 
to disregard many of the negative externalities that emerged in the wake of rapid marketization.  
Much has changed in recent years. Leaders evidence growing awareness of the danger of 
hitching the legitimacy and longevity of their Communist party-state to an economic engine 
whose velocity is slowing. The second term of the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration (2007–
2012) saw a flurry of government regulations and initiatives intended to redress many of the 
social ills and grievances that had accrued during the previous thirty years of extremely rapid yet 
highly unequal growth. New labor laws, medical insurance schemes, pensions, poverty 
alleviation programs, and higher-education expansion formed part of an ambitious bid to secure 
popular support and thereby sustain party rule. The newly installed Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang 
leadership seems committed to deepening a comprehensive project of social reform, while at the 
same time declaring war on the rampant cadre corruption that has become a lightning rod for 
popular discontent. The Xi–Li administration openly acknowledges worrisome economic 
indicators to underscore the need for further fiscal reform. Moreover, with the fate of the 
political system believed to hang in the balance, party-state leaders express urgency for making 
progress on a range of policy challenges that extend well beyond GDP growth rates.  The Mass 
Line Campaign, launched in June 2013, enjoins party cadres to eschew extravagance in order to 
avoid the loss of popular support believed responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Progressive social policies and stricter party discipline, buttressed by solid economic 
reform, are not the only means by which the CCP endeavors to stay in power. What the state 
euphemistically refers to as “social management” (shehui guanli), or the resolution of social 
tensions through a potent mixture of coercion and accommodation, remains a staple instrument 
of control that helps account for the absence of large-scale political demonstrations in the 
twenty-five years since Tiananmen. Press and Internet censorship are an important element of 
this strategy. Another factor in the CCP’s capacity to defuse political challenge is the leaders’ 
proven aptitude for “cultural governance,” or the invention and application of resonant symbolic 
resources designed to enhance the party’s image and endear it to the people.
1 Rather than simply 
suppress unwelcome media reports or blog postings, for example, the authorities take an active 
role in planting their own interpretation of events so as to “guide public sentiment” (yindao 
yuqing) in directions favorable to the party’s agenda. These various techniques have deep roots 
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in the history of the CCP as both a revolutionary and a ruling party, but they have been 
substantially modified and modernized to suit contemporary conditions.
2 
In light of the demise of Communist party-states across most of the globe, it may be 
tempting to discount the CCP’s contemporary policy experiments as a desperate ploy by a soon-
to-be doomed regime. But the post-Mao state has already survived–and indeed thrived–for far 
too long not to be taken seriously as a subject for comparative public policy investigation. 
Moreover, the historical origins of the PRC suggest that its future may not be well predicted by 
the fates of the former Soviet Union or East European Communist regimes.
3 The PRC–like all 
other still extant Communist regimes (that is, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and North Korea)–ascended 
to power via an extended rural revolution that endowed the regime and its ruling Communist 
Party with strong nationalist credentials. This stands in contrast to the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, which gained control through a relatively short and narrowly based urban 
revolution. The difference with Eastern Europe, where Communist regimes were generally 
imposed by Soviet military might at the end of World War II, is even sharper. Unlike most of the 
formerly Communist world, the PRC and its few fellow surviving Communist states attained 
power in the course of prolonged and pervasive peasant mobilization. That rich revolutionary 
history bequeathed valuable practical experience in social organization and control, while 
bestowing important political advantages that have so far withstood the test of time. This is by no 
means to suggest that such regimes are destined to last forever, but whatever the PRC’s eventual 
life span turns out to be, its remarkable rise and resilience to date suggest that we are better 
advised to treat its current challenges and complaints as the growing pains of a body politic still 
in the process of maturation, not as the death pangs of a Communist dinosaur destined to 
imminent extinction.  
Thus, rather than frame our inquiry in terms of the prospects for regime change, as so 
much social science work on contemporary China is apt to do, the contributors to this issue of 
Dædalus were invited to explore ways in which the Chinese state is addressing actual policy 
concerns, from popular protest to public health. Although these policy challenges may be 
especially pronounced and politically sensitive in China, in light of the country’s exceptional size 
and rapid economic growth under a basically unreformed Communist political system, they are 
also problems common to all countries. Contributors were encouraged to assess the Chinese 
state’s record in a comparative context, highlighting what is unique or unusual (for better or 
worse) in the PRC’s efforts to resolve these universal dilemmas. 
This collective exercise yields a complex portrait of a government and society that are 
tackling at once, with varying degrees of success, a broad range of issues that bedevil developed 
and developing countries alike. Some of the thorniest challenges, ironically enough, stem either 
directly or indirectly from the remarkable results of earlier PRC reform efforts, including the 
one-child-family program and the rural industrialization boom. From dramatic demographic 
transition to devastating environmental degradation, the ensuing problems are often intractable 
and the solutions seldom entirely obvious or easy. In contrast to some other countries, however, 
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the Chinese case is noteworthy for a growing recognition of the seriousness of these questions on 
the part of both government officials and ordinary citizens.  
Somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, China’s lack of democratic processes and institutions 
contributes to the urgency with which such policy challenges are regarded. For example, in a 
context where massive protests ignited by medical malpractice or environmental pollution are 
viewed as capable of detonating the entire system, the apparent danger of inaction is intensified 
and the political dividend for alleviating such problems is amplified. While it is certainly true 
that the absence of democratic channels for expressing and redressing popular grievances is itself 
responsible for the severity of a number of these troubles, that same democratic deficit puts 
immense pressure on the government leadership to arrive at effective solutions. To be sure, the 
draconian methods employed by the Chinese state to address some of its challenges would be 
deemed both unfeasible and unpalatable in a more liberal political setting. Even so, the fact that 
many of the problems with which China is currently grappling are global in compass and 
consequence renders its public policy record of more than parochial interest and importance. 
*** 
Without democratic institutions capable of conferring procedural legitimacy, the ability of the 
PRC to meet its pressing policy challenges will depend to some degree upon continued economic 
expansion capable of generating adequate employment opportunities and financing critical 
redistributive and other government-led programs. While the sizzling growth rates of the initial 
decades of reform are unsustainable over the long run, a steady pace of development is vital to 
realizing the state’s ambitious social policy agenda. As Barry Naughton points out in his essay in 
this volume, China is already exceptional among large economies in its unusually high level of 
state investment. Linking this overinvestment (compounded by financial fragility, local 
government debt, demographic changes, and other systemic shortcomings) to an inevitable 
economic slowdown, Naughton argues nonetheless that “serious market-oriented economic 
reforms are possible in the immediate future.” So long as central leaders act preemptively in 
promoting a financial restructuring to blunt the power of vested interests (including their own), 
the Chinese economy can move to a lower but more sustainable growth rate in the context of a 
richer, more prosperous society. Naughton stresses that “[i]t absolutely has the capacity to do so, 
but policy-makers must summon the will and determination.” The previous Hu–Wen 
administration proved unable to meet this politically difficult challenge; whether the Xi–Li 
leadership will rise to the task remains to be seen. 
Even under the most optimistic of economic scenarios, however, it is clear that the state 
will need to overcome a number of vexing social problems. Among the most serious, as Deborah 
Davis observes in her essay, is the demographic issue. Decades of low fertility encouraged by the 
single-child-family policy have contributed to a rapidly aging population. The deleterious 
consequences are particularly pronounced in the countryside, where massive out-migration has 
left elderly villagers with no adult children to provide support. While the problem of an aging 
population is nothing new for many countries in the developed world, Davis points out that 
“China will become old before the country becomes rich.” The dilemma is intensified by the fact 
that wealth in China is so unevenly distributed. Martin Whyte notes in his contribution that 
“China has experienced an unusually sharp increase in income inequality since the early 1980s 
and currently ranks fairly high compared to other societies in terms of the gaps between its rich 
and poor citizens.” This inequality, Whyte explains, conforms closely to spatial lines that were 5	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drawn during the Mao era.
4 To overcome such deeply entrenched divisions between city and 
countryside will demand bold and wide-ranging reform.  
Among the most pressing reforms required to blunt the impact of rural poverty are 
improvements in health care provision. Yet, as William Hsiao emphasizes in his essay, the 
quality and accessibility of medical care in contemporary China also follows the spatial divide: 
“The disparity in access to quality health care between rural and urban areas has in essence 
created a two-tiered system. Although the top level is similar to health care available in first-
world nations, the lower tier of the Chinese health care system is more typical of that found in 
the third world.” The solution, Hsiao argues, will require more than simply increased state 
investment. In fact, he cautions that “more investment in health may not improve health 
outcomes.” Nothing short of a fundamental reorientation in medical ethics, combined with a 
major restructuring of public hospital governance, will do the trick. Despite this grim assessment 
of the problems bedeviling the Chinese health system, Hsiao’s comparison with another large 
developing country, India, puts the Chinese record in a more favorable light. After a decade of 
government attention on the part of both countries to providing health care to the rural poor, 
China has managed to extend medical insurance to 95 percent of its citizens whereas India has 
succeeded in covering a scant 25 percent of its population.  
As Mark Frazier reminds us, how we evaluate China’s relative progress on social policy 
(including old-age pensions, public education, and affordable housing, in addition to health care) 
depends on the cross-national comparison set. The most common sets of countries against which 
China is typically assessed, the East Asian developmental states and the post-socialist 
transitional economies, may not be the most appropriate or illuminating for this purpose. 
According to Frazier, a more useful grouping is what he calls “large uneven developers” (such as 
India, Brazil, and South Africa) with legacies of severe rural-urban inequality combined with 
periods of rapid economic growth. Put in this framework, the Chinese policy path emerges as 
quite distinctive, although the comparative efficacy of its “more categorical and spatial” 
approach to overcoming the urban-rural divide remains to be seen, especially should the Chinese 
state be faced with a sudden and sharp economic downturn. 
Posing a particular challenge to the PRC’s commitment to poverty alleviation is the 
dismal plight of hundreds of millions of internal migrants. The continuing structural divide 
between city and countryside–reinforced by a “household registration” (hukou) system that 
remains officially intact, despite the emergence of a “floating population” (liudong renkou) 
whose actual places of residence (in cities) do not match their official (rural) status–makes this a 
slippery issue for the state to address. Compounding the state’s difficulties is the growing 
activism of young migrant workers whose increased mobilization and awareness of their legal 
rights, Mary Gallagher contends, “stands in sharp contrast to the state of labor movements in 
other transitional and developing countries.” To deal with the upsurge in large-scale strikes and 
demonstrations, the state has intervened more directly in the dispute resolution process in a move 
that Gallagher characterizes as “problematic for the rule of law and the fledgling legal system.”  
Gallagher’s conclusion is consistent with that of Benjamin Liebman, who further 
suggests that the Chinese party-state’s preference for rapid conflict resolution over adherence to 
legal procedures may actually be serving to engender even greater social instability. Because the 
Chinese Communist Party does not derive its own legitimacy from the law, its commitment to 
the legal process is inherently weak. A rise in popular protest over the past decade has been met 
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by a retreat from legal reform in favor of what Liebman calls a “return to populist legality,” or 
the reliance on dispute mediation led by local party officials. Ironically, this effort to dampen 
rampant protest by party mediation seems to have had precisely the opposite of its intended 
effect, encouraging yet other complainants “to pursue their grievance outside the legal system,” 
thus promoting even more unrest. 
Coping with a high level of protest is certainly nothing new for the Chinese political 
system. Popular protest has been a staple feature of state-society relations in China for centuries. 
Imperial China, Republican China, and Mao’s China were all beset by widespread societal 
contention that severely tested state control.
5 Despite this continuity, the modes and meanings of 
social protest and state response have fluctuated markedly, reflecting profound changes in both 
concerns and capacities. Among the most striking recent developments has been the turn to the 
Internet and other forms of new social media on the part of aggrieved citizen activists and 
attentive state officials alike. Guobin Yang explains in his essay that the areas and sites of 
government regulation and control have expanded in tandem with changes in citizen activism: 
“Today, content and service regulation is all-encompassing, including Internet cafés, bulletin 
board systems, text-messaging, online news, video and audio sharing websites, online games, 
and blogs and microblogs.” Managing and channeling online contention is but one of a number 
of adaptive state techniques for coping with new modes of popular protest. Ching Kwan Lee 
points out in her essay that ever since the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the Chinese 
state has also resorted increasingly to a practice that officials call “buying stability”–bargaining 
with protesters by offering them cash payments–as a means of deterring or defusing street 
demonstrations and other disruptive activities. Although the approach has helped depoliticize 
state-society interactions, Lee argues that this “turn to the market as a mechanism of 
governance” holds a number of corrosive implications, of which the most serious may be a 
decline in state authority.  
*** 
Throughout Chinese history, “heterodox” religions helped inspire and instigate anti-state 
contestation. That historical heritage, compounded by Marxism-Leninism’s hostility toward 
religion in general, contributes to the party-state’s suspicion toward all manner of spiritual 
beliefs and practices–from Falun Gong to Islam. The remarkable religious upsurge now 
sweeping China thus triggers special political concerns. The state has, unsurprisingly, been slow 
to bestow official recognition on the myriad of new religious groups that have emerged. As 
Robert Weller explains, the response of Chinese officials has been to “govern with one eye 
closed,” or “simply leave religion alone as long as they feel that no lines have been crossed,” 
rather than to change the official regulatory system to conform to the new reality. Hypocritical 
though this stance may be, it allows the state to manage the situation without revamping its basic 
corporatist model.  
While state authorities are reluctant to abandon or overhaul the fundamental system of 
social control, they have not been shy about experimentation in a range of key policy domains. 
William Kirby’s essay on higher education explores one of the most dynamic policy arenas in 
contemporary China. The phenomenal explosion in university enrollments and commensurate 
expansion in campus size and facilities reflect a major state investment in the development of 
higher education. Yet as Kirby notes, the state’s strategy “has been elitist as well as massive.” 
Aiming to promote a privileged stable of “world class” universities capable of competing with 
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top-ranked institutions around the globe, the Chinese government has been pouring enormous 
sums of money into a handful of its leading universities, a strategy that exacerbates preexisting 
divisions between privileged and disprivileged students and faculty. By Kirby’s account, the jury 
is still out on a haunting question facing China’s educational ambitions: “can ‘world-class’ 
universities . . . exist in a politically illiberal system?”  
China’s policies in the field of higher education are obviously influenced by the pressures 
and promises of “global rankings,” which raise high hopes of being able to clamber up to the top 
tier on the basis of certain objective and universally acknowledged benchmarks. But Jeffrey 
Wasserstrom, citing the insight of British historian C. A. Bayly with respect to an earlier age of 
globalization, points out that the relentless drive toward international uniformity does not 
necessarily imply homogenization: “[t]oday, as well, it is useful to see globalization as leading to 
standardization without the eclipsing of difference.” Drawing on examples as far afield as world 
exhibitions and world religions, Wasserstrom shows how China’s adoption of common cross-
national forms has in turn filled them with distinctive national content.  
The two concluding essays point to serious issues of governance that may well stand in 
the way of China’s aspirations, global and domestic alike. The essay by Joseph Fewsmith and 
Gao Xiang highlights a “crisis in local governance” that shields grassroots officials from 
accountability and subverts Beijing’s efforts to build a service-oriented government. As central 
leaders move away from a singular focus on economic growth to a broader array of concerns 
encompassing corruption control, stability maintenance, social welfare, and environmental 
protection, the interests and incentives of central and local governments are no longer closely 
aligned. To date, Beijing’s reluctance to tighten the reins on the localities has redounded in its 
favor by deflecting public grievances from central to local authorities, but the continuation of 
this decentralized administrative system means that “the people who have borne much of the cost 
of this rapid development have been those who should have been its beneficiaries: the local 
residents.”  
The decentralized governance system also presents major problems for environmental 
protection, an issue that is of growing concern not only to China’s own residents but to the global 
community at large. Pollutants from China’s coal-fired power plants fall as acid rain on Seoul 
and Tokyo, and even much of the particulate pollution hanging over Los Angeles these days 
reportedly originates in China.
6 Observing that China’s environmental protection record fares 
badly by almost any comparative measure, Elizabeth Economy places the blame squarely on the 
system of governance: “At the heart of the Chinese government’s inability to protect the 
environment is the country’s own particular mix of political institutions, processes, and incentive 
structures.” While this administrative configuration may have served China surprisingly well 
during the preceding decades of head-spinning economic growth, it appears less well suited to 
the more diverse policy agenda that the center is increasingly anxious to pursue. Echoing the 
conclusion of other essays in this issue of Dædalus, Economy detects “an uneasy, often 
politically fraught situation defined by official adherence to traditional, often ineffectual modes 
of government policy-making at the national level and crisis-management at the local level.” Yet 
she also looks more hopefully to a rising urban middle class, armed with Internet access, that “is 
changing the relative power dynamic between the state and society.” 
*** 
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In short, China’s ongoing process of “reform and opening” remains fluid and highly 
unpredictable. While few would deny the stunning strides of the past thirty years, the very 
successes of earlier programs and policies have generated new and difficult problems that may 
well demand a more thoroughgoing reconfiguration of political institutions and operations than 
the top leadership has yet been willing to undertake. But this does not necessarily mean that 
democratization is on the immediate horizon. Nor does it relieve us of responsibility for taking a 
serious look at the ways in which China is coping with current dilemmas. However long or short 
the future of the Chinese Communist system may be, the complex challenges of attaining and 
balancing goals of economic development, official accountability, environmental protection, 
poverty reduction, and social equity will surely remain high on both Chinese and global agendas.  
Taken as a whole, the PRC’s approach to policy challenges is in many ways unique, 
thanks to the country’s unusual size and regional diversity, as well as to its distinctive 
revolutionary history and current political-economic configuration. Yet as the essays in this 
volume demonstrate, placing particular policy approaches in comparative perspective is 
illuminating, not least because different policy domains evoke different parallels. China’s rapid 
economic growth invites comparison to the other developmental states of East Asia, while its 
difficulties in delivering social welfare may be better understood in the context of other large and 
uneven late developers like India and Brazil. The Communist party-state’s response to Internet 
activism and social unrest might seem at first blush comparable only to other authoritarian 
systems, yet several of the essays draw telling comparisons (and contrasts) with the United States 
as well.  
Thinking comparatively about global dilemmas is of more than academic interest. We 
live today in a fragile yet interdependent post–Cold War world troubled by serious transnational 
challenges that range from pandemics and climate change to financial meltdowns and terrorism. 
Institutions of governance as different as the Chinese Communist Politburo and the U.S. 
Congress find themselves severely tested both ideologically and operationally in trying to 
address such issues. We would be foolhardy to disregard or discount China’s efforts to resolve 
global problems simply because we predict that its political system is some day destined to 
disappear.  
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